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FLEXIBLE ARBITRATION FOR THE DEVELOPING WORLD: 
PIERO FORESTI AND THE FUTURE OF BILATERAL 
INVESTMENT TREATIES IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH 
Andrew Friedman* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Over the past few decades, international trade has become inundated 
with bilateral investment treaties (BITs), “agreements between two 
countries for the reciprocal encouragement, promotion and protection of 
investments in each other's territories by companies based in either 
country.”1 Capital exporting and capital importing states have begun to 
use BITs as a precursor to investment. In fact, as of 2005, more than 140 
countries were party to at least one such treaty, most having agreed to 
considerably more.2 Today, well over 2,000 BITs exist and there is little 
doubt that the growth trend will continue.3 The international system of 
BITs has become extremely important, affecting not only ultra rich and 
poor countries, but countries at all stages of development. The rapid 
expansion of BITs around the world has raised an important issue in 
international law: whether entering into a BIT precludes a country from 
passing legislation to correct past social injustices. This particular issue 
was recently addressed in Piero Foresti v. Republic of South Africa, an 
arbitral case in which the parties ultimately settled outside of the tribunal, 
thereby leaving important questions unanswered pertaining to the future 
development of the Global South.4 
The Foresti case began on November 8, 2006 when several Italian 
citizens and a number of Luxembourg-based corporations engaged in 
mining in South Africa registered a request for arbitration with the 
                                                           
*Andrew Friedman graduated Cum Laude from the University of Illinois College of Law and 
is currently pursuing an LLM in International Law and Development at the University of 
Nottingham. A special thanks to Josh Berrett and all the other editors for their hard work on this 
article.  
1
 What are BITs?, U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV, 
http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/Page____1006.aspx (last updated Aug. 17, 2004). 
2 Calvin A. Hamilton & Paula I. Rochwerger, Trade and Investment: Foreign Direct 
Investment through Bilateral and Multilateral Treaties, 18 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 1, 3 (2005). 
3 ICSID Database of Bilateral Investment Treaties, INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF 
INVESTMENT DISP., http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet (follow “Bilateral Investment 
Treaties” hyperlink; follow “View All” hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 25, 2010).  
4 See Piero Foresti, et al. v. Republic of S. Afr., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/1, Award of the 
Tribunal (Aug. 4, 2010), 
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=GenCaseDtlsRH&actionVal=ListConcl
uded (scroll to number 185; follow “English(Original)” hyperlink) [hereinafter Foresti]. 
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International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) 
against the Republic of South Africa.5 The case concerned the Black 
Economic Empowerment (BEE) provisions of the Minerals and 
Petroleum Resources Development Act of 2002 (MPRDA), which was 
enacted after South Africa transitioned from an apartheid system to a 
democratic government.6 Pursuant to authority granted under the 
MPRDA, the South African government seized ownership of all natural 
resources located in the country,7 and thereafter determined the rights of 
mineral exploitation through a system of licensing.8 Companies that 
previously held private mineral rights were forced to apply for licenses to 
continue their operations.9 While these laws were designed to alleviate 
the effects of the historical racial inequity that occurred under the 
apartheid system, the claimants challenged the policies as a violation of 
South Africa’s international obligations under its BITs and claimed that 
they amounted to expropriation under international law.10 
The Foresti case is vastly important to the future of a democratic 
South Africa, and also has wide implications for the development of the 
entire Global South. As the expansion of BITs continues, the question 
posed in the Foresti arbitration is likely to come up quite frequently. As 
stated by various human rights organizations involved in the Foresti 
arbitration, the issue at hand “is the scope of the post-apartheid South 
African government’s ability, under domestic and international law, to 
implement legislative and policy decisions designed to redress the 
devastating socio-economic legacy left by apartheid.”11 More generally 
stated, the issue is whether entering into BITs can prevent a developing 
country from using certain types of legislation to correct past social 
injustices. The answer to such a question is likely to have tremendous 
repercussions throughout the developing world.  
This article is divided into several parts.  Part II will give a brief 
overview of apartheid and its social and economic effects on South 
Africa to set the stage for a discussion of the Foresti arbitration. Part III 
will discuss the South African government’s efforts to cure the social and 
                                                           
5 Id. ¶ 1. 
6 See Piero Foresti, et al. v. Republic of S. Afr., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/1, Petition for 
Limited Participation as Non-Disputing Parties in Terms of Articles 41(3), 27, 39, and 35 of the 
Additional Facility Rules, ¶ 4.1-4.2 (July 17, 2009), available at 
http://www.investmenttreatynews.org/documents/p/214/download.aspx [hereinafter Human Rights 
NDP Petition]. 
7 See Damon Vis-Dunbar, South African court judgment bolsters expropriation charge over 
Black Economic Empowerment legislation in the mining sector, INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS (Mar. 
23, 2009), http://www.investmenttreatynews.org/cms/news/archive/2009/03/23/south-african-court-
judgment-bolsters-expropriation-charge-over-black-economic-empowerment-legislation.aspx. 
8 See id. 
9 See id. 
10 See Human Rights NDP Petition, supra note 6, ¶ 4.2. 
11 Id. 
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economic effects of apartheid.  Part IV will describe how these efforts 
led to the Foresti case and analyze the expropriations claims in that case.  
Part V will discuss the traditional test used by arbitral tribunals in 
expropriation cases under international law and will argue that ICSID 
should abandon this traditional test in favor of a more flexible three-
factor test.  Part VI will then discuss the possible implications for 
developing countries if ICSID were to adopt the proposed three-factor 
test for analyzing expropriation claims.  Part VII will conclude. 
II. APARTHEID AND ITS SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC EFFECTS ON 
SOUTH AFRICA 
In addition to the post-apartheid South African government’s move 
toward economic security and development through the signing of BITs, 
the new government also aimed to alleviate the societal devastation that 
resulted from more than a half-century of apartheid governance. Through 
a system of apartheid, white South Africans systematically 
disadvantaged black South Africans—the majority of South Africa’s 
population—in many ways.  Today, this system of apartheid continues to 
influence South Africa’s economic development long after the 
establishment of the democratic government.12 
In addition to the visible problems associated with extreme poverty, 
hunger, and lack of shelter, many less apparent problems continue to 
limit the opportunities of black South Africans. Under apartheid, the 
South African government took measures to ensure that black South 
Africans were not able to become self-reliant.13 The apartheid South 
African government denied black South Africans the possibility of 
entrepreneurship, self-employment, and skills development.14 The 
apartheid South African government also confined Black South Africans 
to homeland areas that were incredibly impoverished and lacked proper 
business infrastructure.15 These disadvantages severely limited the ability 
of black South Africans to compete in the new dynamic business 
environment that arose after the fall of the apartheid system.16 
                                                           
12 See Bureau of African Affairs, Background Note: South Africa, U.S. DEP’T OF ST., 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2898.htm (last updated Nov. 17, 2010). 
13 See SOUTH AFRICA’S ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION: A STRATEGY FOR BROAD-BASED 
BLACK ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT ¶¶ 1.2, 2.2.3, available at 
http://www.kznhealth.gov.za/TED/strategy.pdf [hereinafter BEE STRATEGY DOC.]. 
14 See id. 
15 See id. 
16 See BEE STRATEGY DOC., supra note 13. 
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At the time the Foresti arbitration was filed, the problems stemming 
from apartheid in were deeply entrenched in South African society and 
there remained a large disparity in income between black and white 
South Africans. According to the United Nations Development Program, 
in 2003, 62% of Black South Africans lived below the national poverty 
line, while only 1.5% of White South Africans lived below that level.17 
Similarly, only 45% of Black South Africans lived in formal housing 
while 89% of White South Africans enjoyed this basic human right.18 
Moreover, while Black South Africans comprised 79% of South Africa’s 
population, they owned only 18% of the country’s land at the end of 
2008.19 
Besides creating moral and social problems, the post-apartheid South 
African government also regarded the disparity between white and black 
South Africans as a significant impediment to economic growth. A 
strategy paper published by the post-apartheid South African 
government’s Department of Trade and Industry states that “[n]o 
economy can grow by excluding any part of its people and an economy 
that is not growing cannot integrate all of its citizens in a meaningful 
way.”20 The South African government chose to address the disparity 
problem caused by apartheid, in part, by implementing a series of 
policies known as Black Economic Empowerment (BEE). 
III. BLACK ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT 
BEE policies came to pervade many levels of South African 
legislation. The South African government’s Department of Trade and 
Industry created a list of policy objectives, which included (1) increasing 
black South African ownership interest in enterprises in both standard 
and priority sectors of the economy, (2) increasing the number of new 
black South African enterprises, and (3) increasing the number of black 
South Africans in executive management positions.21 To accomplish 
these objectives, the post-apartheid South African government was given 
broad powers to legislate and regulate.22 
These broad powers allowed the government to include BEE 
provisions in many future South African laws. These laws addressed 
                                                           
17 Human Rights NDP Petition, supra note 6, ¶ 4.3 (quoting UNDP Human Development 
Report 2003 and Yolandi Groenawald, Who owns what land in South Africa?, MAIL & GUARDIAN 
ONLINE (Jan 23. 2009), http://www.mg.co.za/article/2009-01-23-who-owns-what-land-in-south-
africa). 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 BEE STRATEGY DOC., supra note 13, ¶ 3.4.4.1. 
21 See id. ¶ 3.3. 
22 See id. ¶¶ 3.5.2, 3.5.3. 
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incredibly diverse issues including equity of employment, mining rights 
and mandatory divestments.23 The most controversial bills containing 
BEE policies were those requiring the transfer of certain percentages of 
enterprise ownership to black South Africans. For example, the MPRDA, 
mentioned above, initially required Black South African enterprises to 
own 51% of the nation’s mining industry.24 This BEE policy was an 
attempt to alleviate some of the economic problems associated with 
apartheid and to allow the country to reach its full economic potential by 
utilizing its entire population.25 In response to much opposition regarding 
the MPRDA’s 51% requirement, the post-apartheid South African 
government reduced the percentage of ownership by black South 
Africans to 26%. Despite this change to the MPRDA, the bill led to the 
Foresti arbitration.26  
IV. THE CASE 
One of MPRDA’s stated objectives is to “substantially and 
meaningfully expand opportunities for historically disadvantaged 
persons, including women and communities, to enter the mineral and 
petroleum industries and to benefit from the exploitation of the nation’s 
mineral and petroleum resources.”27 Additionally, the MPRDA contains 
many BEE provisions that would create large-scale changes to the 
mining and petroleum industries. As previously mentioned, one of the 
most controversial sections of the MPRDA is the mandated 26% 
ownership stake in mineral exploitation by black South Africans.28 
Nevertheless, for international investors, this was not the most disturbing 
provision.  
The MPRDA also created a new system by which mineral rights 
would be distributed to mining enterprises. Under the previous mining 
law, the South African Minerals Act of 1991 (SAMA), private 
enterprises that owned land with natural resources also owned those 
resources. However, under the new system created by the MPRDA, the 
post-apartheid South African government seized ownership of all natural 
                                                           
23 LUKE ERIC PETERSON, SOUTH AFRICA’S BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES: IMPLICATIONS 
FOR DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS, 16 (November, 2006), available at 
http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/global/04137-20080708.pdf (citing DEP’T OF TRADE INDUS. 
STRATEGY DOC, A STRATEGY FOR BROAD-BASED BLACK EMPOWERMENT, available at 
http://www.dti.gov.za/bee/complete.pdf). 
24 Id. 
25 See BEE STRATEGY DOC., supra note 13, ¶¶ 1.1-1.2. 
26 See Foresti, supra note 4, ¶ 54.  
27 Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002 s. 2(d) (S.Afr.). 
28 See PETERSON, supra note 23. 
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resources in the country.29 The post-apartheid South African government 
then determined the rights of mineral exploitation through a system of 
licensing.30 Private enterprises that previously held mineral rights were 
given the opportunity to apply for licenses to continue their operations.31 
However, many of the private enterprises complained that the rights 
given through the licensing procedure were not the same as the rights 
they previously enjoyed under SAMA. Mineral exploitation companies 
found many provisions of the MPRDA upsetting, including a five-year 
limit on licenses, after which companies must reapply.32 Furthermore, 
such licenses could be denied for a broad range of reasons.33 
The transition from a system of private ownership of mineral rights 
established under SAMA to a new system of government ownership 
under the MPRDA led to the Foresti arbitration. As mentioned above, in 
Foresti, a group of Italian nationals and Luxembourg-based companies 
(claimants) filed for arbitration with ICSID on November 8, 2006, 
alleging that the MPRDA’s system of government ownership of 
previously held private mineral rights amounted to expropriation.34 
After the filing, four non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
requested permission from ICSID to jointly file amicus curiae with the 
tribunal pursuant to ICSID Additional Facility rules 41(3) 27, 39 and 
35.35 Of the four NGOs, two were South African and two were 
international. The two South African NGOs were the Centre for Applied 
Legal Studies and the Legal Resources Centre. The two South African 
NGOs claimed that their presence in the Foresti arbitration would 
provide local knowledge and context of the public interest issues at stake, 
and could thereby assist ICSID in understanding such issues.36 The two 
international petitioners, the Center for International Environmental Law 
and the International Centre for the Legal Protection of Human Rights 
(the “Human Rights NGOs”), focused on bringing an international or 
systemic perspective on the human rights issues addressed in the 
arbitration.37 
Additionally, the International Commission of Jurists filed a petition 
to take part in the proceedings as a non-disputing party (NDP).38 In 
                                                           
29 See Vis-Dunbar, supra note 7. 
30 See id. 
31 See id. 
32 See, e.g., Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002 s. 17(6) (S.Afr.). 
33 See id. 
34 Foresti, supra note 4, ¶¶ 1, 54. 
35 Human Rights NDP Petition, supra note 6, ¶ 1. 
36 See id. ¶¶ 3.1-3.3. 
37 See id. ¶¶ 3.4-3.6. 
38 Piero Foresti v. Republic of S. Afr., Case No. ARB(AF)/07/01, 3 (Aug. 19, 2009), Petition 
for Participation as Non-Disputing Party Pursuant to Article 41(3) of the ICSID Arbitration 
(Additional Facility) Rules, available at 
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contrast to the perspective that the four other NGOs would bring to 
ICSID regarding public interest and human rights issues at stake in the 
Foresti arbitration, the International Commission of Jurists intended to 
provide context based on the status of international law.39 In response to 
these petitions, and after consultation with the parties in dispute, the 
ICSID tribunal opted to allow the two sets of non-disputing parties to 
participate, stating, “NDP participation is intended to enable NDPs to 
give useful information and accompanying submissions to the 
Tribunal.”40 
V. EXPROPRIATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 
To determine whether an expropriation took place in an arbitration 
case, ICSID traditionally has looked to whether an expropriation 
occurred under international law. According to this standard, an 
expropriation occurs where constructive expropriation is found to have 
taken place and where the effect on the owner is found to be tantamount 
to an expropriation.41 There is considerable legal debate surrounding 
South Africa’s transition from the old-order of private ownership of 
mineral rights to the new-order of government ownership and licensing 
of such rights under the MPRDA, and whether such new-order 
government ownership and licensing amounts to expropriation in 
Foresti. Interestingly, in a similar South African case, Agri South Africa 
v. The Ministers of Minerals and Energy, the High Court of South Africa 
held that it was in fact possible for holders of old-order mineral rights to 
prove that they had been expropriated and that the holders had rights to 
claim compensation for that expropriation pursuant to the MPRDA.42   
There is, however, a second and possibly more just method that 
ICSID could implore when deciding expropriation arbitration cases such 
as Foresti. This method was suggested by the Human Rights NGOs in 
the Foresti case. As mentioned above, the issue in Foresti concerned the 
“scope of the post-apartheid South African government’s ability, under 
                                                                                                                                  
http://www.investmenttreatynews.org/documents/p/215/download.aspx [hereinafter ICJ NDP 
Petition].  
39 See id. ¶ 28. 
40 Letter from Eloïse M. Obadia, Secretary of Trib., Int’l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disputes, to 
Jason Brickhall, and Carlos Lopez, Senior Legal Officer, Int’l Comm’n of Jurists (October 5, 2009) 
(on file with author), available at 
http://www.investmenttreatynews.org/documents/p/213/download.aspx. 
41 See Rudolf Dolzer, Indirect Expropriations: New Developments?, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 64, 
79 (2002). 
42 See Agri S. Afr. v. Minister of Minerals and Energy 2009 (1) SA 104 (GNP) (S. Afr.).  
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domestic and international law, to implement legislative and policy 
decisions designed to redress the devastating socio-economic legacy left 
by apartheid.”43 The Human Rights NGOs argued that the ICSID tribunal 
should take into account the “on-the-ground reality” in South Africa that 
vast inequalities exist within the borders of South Africa and “they can 
only be corrected through proactive measures” instead of “abstract 
economic principles.”44 If ICSID were to consider the reality of 
inequality in South Africa, it would likely be much more inclined to 
uphold the BEE policies of the MPRDA. In other words, a ruling 
allowing South Africa “to implement legislative and policy decisions 
designed to redress the devastating socio-economic legacy left by 
apartheid” would significantly change the international takings doctrine 
by allowing arbitral tribunals to examine the reasons behind legislative 
and policy measures and what such measures were meant to achieve, 
rather than simply looking at how the owners of property rights were 
adversely impacted by such measures.45  
ICSID should consider the purposes behind South Africa’s policy 
measures for several important reasons. South Africa has obligations that 
exist under both domestic and international law to eliminate all forms of 
racial discrimination as well as the remnants of the oppressive apartheid 
system. These obligations were proposed in the country’s first 
democratic Constitution, the International Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, and several other international conventions.46 
The United Nations Human Rights Committee has also acknowledged 
that the principle of equality sometimes “requires States to take 
affirmative action to diminish or eliminate conditions which cause or 
perpetuate discrimination prohibited by the Covenant.”47 Thus, on one 
hand, a nation must respect its obligations under its BITs to maintain 
investor confidence and remain a part of the international business 
community, while on the other hand, the same nation must make difficult 
choices to respect international social obligations advanced by various 
international conventions and found in customary international law. This 
conflict may require some nations, such as South Africa, to take 
affirmative action measures to correct past social injustices in the least 
discriminatory way while minimizing the effect on aggrieved parties and 
investors. For these reasons, ICSID should replace the traditional 
expropriation test and employ a new one. 
                                                           
43 Human Rights NDP Petition, supra note 6, ¶ 4.2. 
44 Id. ¶ 4.3. 
45 Id. ¶ 4.2. 
46 See ICJ NDP Petition, supra note 38, ¶ 24. 
47 Id. (quoting CCPR Gen. Comment No. 18: Non-Discrimination, thirty-seventh sess., 1989 
para. 10) (emphasis added). 
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A new expropriation test should grant countries the flexibility needed 
to implement positive change to correct past social injustices while 
maintaining appropriate safeguards.  Under this new test, a tribunal 
should consider the following three factors when determining whether an 
indirect expropriation has taken place: (1) whether there is an 
internationally recognized policy goal for the legislation in question, (2) 
whether the goal can be accomplished in a less discriminatory way, and 
(3) whether the goal can be accomplished while minimizing the effects 
on aggrieved parties and investors. 
A potential argument against adopting this new test is that arbitral 
tribunals will have difficulty determining whether an internationally 
recognized policy goal can be accomplished in a less discriminatory way 
while minimizing the effects on aggrieved parties and investors due to 
the great distance, both geographically and ideologically, between 
international adjudicative bodies—such as the arbitral tribunals—and the 
on-the-ground-realities seen in countries like South Africa. However, the 
participation of non-disputing parties (NDPs) can serve as a solution to 
this problem. While an average international tribunal sitting in The 
Hague, Geneva, or elsewhere may not know the policy realities of a 
capital importing nation, there are likely dozens, if not hundreds, of civil 
society organizations with the technical expertise and contextual 
knowledge to help the tribunal understand these on-the-ground-realities. 
If the ICSID panel in Foresti is any indication, there is an increasing 
willingness to make the documents of disputing parties available to 
NDPs, allowing for greater expertise and more informed decisions by the 
tribunal.48 
A tribunal applying this proposed three-factor expropriation test to 
the facts in the Foresti case should consider the fact that the BEE 
provisions found in the MPRDA are South Africa’s attempt to achieve a 
valid international policy goal. In particular, by creating the BEE 
provisions of the MPRDA, South Africa was attempting to remedy a 
legacy of apartheid as it related to the ownership of mineral rights, a 
sector that is imperative to the health of the South African economy. As 
mentioned, eliminating legislative discrimination and taking affirmative 
steps to remedy past injustices—the policy goals of the BEE 
provisions—are recognized by the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.49 
                                                           
48 See, e.g., Elizabeth Whitsitt, An ICSID Tribunal Introduces Innovative Steps into Non-
Disputing Party Procedure, INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS (Oct. 11, 2009), 
http://www.investmenttreatynews.org/cms/news/archive/2009/10/10/an-icsid-tribunal-introduces-
innovative-steps-into-non-disputing-party-procedure.aspx. 
49 See ICJ NDP Petition, supra note 38, ¶ 24. 
WINTER 2010  Flexible Arbitration 
46 
After having considered the first prong of the proposed three-factor 
test and having successfully determined that an internationally 
recognized policy goal exists for the legislation in question, the tribunal 
should consider the final two factors of the test—namely, whether South 
Africa could have used less discriminatory means to accomplish the 
same policy goal and whether the legislation in question could have been 
crafted in such a way that would cause less harm to the aggrieved parties, 
such as investors. If claimants are able to demonstrate that such an 
alternative means exists, the ICSID tribunal should request NDPs to 
provide information revealing whether the adopted legislation was in fact 
the least discriminatory and least harmful method of achieving the 
desired policy goal—a question of fact that ICSID would likely lack the 
expertise to determine. If the adopted policy was the least discriminatory 
means possible and there was no way that the policy could have had a 
less harmful effect on the claimants, the tribunal should determine that 
the policy is a valid  “[a]ffirmative Action to diminish or eliminate 
conditions which cause or help to perpetuate discrimination”50 under 
international law. While such a three-factor test may seem novel, there 
has been some movement toward taking a “examine the purposes” 
approach in expropriation claims.51 Nevertheless, such an approach has 
not become widely accepted in international law because it only focuses 
on indirect expropriations created for “legitimate purposes,” which is a 
muddled concept of questionable importance when discussing 
affirmative steps towards equality. 
The three-factor test is advantageous and desirable because it 
consolidates the two competing international responsibilities of nations 
like South Africa. It also provides incentives for companies and 
developing countries to work together in crafting legislation to achieve 
policy goals with minimal interference to investor interests. Furthermore, 
under the three-factor analysis, corporations and capital importing 
countries may be more inclined to form relationships that could lead to 
the continuous flow of investments, thereby achieving one of the 
fundamental purposes of BITs and the ICSID arbitral system.52  
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPING STATES 
All members of the international community struggle to find a 
balance between competing international obligations. This struggle is 
                                                           
50 ICJ NDP Petition, supra note 38, ¶ 24 (quoting CCPR Gen. Comment No. 18: Non-
Discrimination, thirty-seventh sess., 1989 para. 10). 
51 See Dolzer, supra note 41, at 66.  
52 See Johanna Kalb, Creating an ICSID Appellate Body, 10 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 
179, 181 (2005). 
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much stronger for developing states. In addition to their dependence on 
international investment to bring money and jobs into the country, 
developing countries are likely to have histories that require some sort of 
egalitarian social transformation as a result of discriminatory systems 
such as apartheid, or devastating social events such as civil war, ongoing 
civil strife, or coups.53 Social transformation of a developing country can 
also be hindered by a legacy of colonialism, poverty, inequity, poor 
governance, tropical climate and disease. Identifying some of these 
social issues will be beneficial when discussing the advantages of using 
the above three-factor analysis to arbitrate matters involving a conflict 
between investment obligations stemming from BITs and social 
obligations under international and domestic law, such as the BEE 
provisions of the MPRDA. To illustrate some of the issues related to 
social transformation more clearly, the next section will discuss problems 
pertaining to urban/rural wealth gaps as well as problems resulting from 
civil upheaval, both of which are commonplace in developing countries. 
A. The Urban to Rural Wealth Gap 
The first social issue is the prominent urban/rural wealth gap that 
exists in much of the world. For example, in Bolivia, one of the most 
impoverished states in Latin America, many of the urban elite are of 
Spanish ancestry and have historically dominated the country’s economic 
and political sectors.54 The majority of rural dwellers, on the other hand, 
are subsistence farmers or salt miners, often unable to make ends meet.55 
In addition to the income disparity between the two groups, there is also 
a disparity in educational opportunities that would serve to eradicate the 
wealth gap. Furthermore, while schools are prevalent in urban centers, 
there are virtually no schools in rural areas.56 
The President of Bolivia, Evo Morales, has vowed to change this 
disparity.57 In President Morales’ first term in office, he successfully 
passed a new constitution that included many new indigenous rights.58 
The new constitution, for example, contains a provision that has the 
                                                           
53 See generally PAUL COLLIER, THE BOTTOM BILLION, 17-19 (2008) (discussing how 73% of 
the world’s poorest people live in countries that have either recently been or are currently civil war, 
and that by halving a country’s income its statistical likelihood of civil war doubles). 
54 Bolivia Country Profile, BBC NEWS, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/country_profiles/1210487.stm (last updated Dec. 28, 2010) 
[hereinafter Bolivia Country Profile]. 
55 See id. 
56 See generally Bolivia: Education for Life and Citizenship, UNICEF.ORG, 
http://www.unicef.org/bolivia/education_for_all_1403.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2010). 
57 See Bolivia Country Profile, supra note 54. 
58 See id. 
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potential to give the rural populations control of the natural resources in 
their territory.59 This is a substantial change because the country’s 
biggest exports are currently natural resources, such as natural gas and 
various precious metals.60  
In light of this new constitutional provision, one potential solution to 
Bolivia’s poverty may lie in its lithium deposits. Bolivia has the world’s 
largest supply of lithium, a heavy metal that was thought to be virtually 
useless until it gained prominence in batteries for various electronics and 
electric cars.61 Because Bolivia’s lithium deposits are found in the Salar 
regions, far from any urban centers, President Morales’ new 
constitutional provision may have the effect of allocating what could 
well be the country’s most important export to Bolivia’s rural population, 
nearly all of whom are of indigenous descent.62 
President Morales’s new constitution, and its provisions granting 
Bolivian citizens in rural areas the right to control the natural resources 
in their territories, has not, thus far, conflicted with any of Bolivia’s 
BITs. However, if a foreign company held mineral rights prior to the 
establishment of President Morales’s constitution, the scenario would be 
much like the one in Foresti.  Under such a scenario, and assuming that 
President Morales’s constitutional provision resulted in an expropriation 
of the mineral rights of foreign owned companies, the first step in the 
three-factor analysis would be to determine whether such a constitutional 
change was made pursuant to an internationally recognized policy goal.  
In Bolivia’s case, there seems to be an internationally recognized policy 
goal for these provisions. Several conventions declare various rights for 
indigenous populations, including the Declaration on the Rights of 
Persons belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic 
Minorities, the Rio Declaration of Environment and Development, and 
the UN General Assembly’s Draft Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples.63 These documents and the overarching principle of 
equality included in nearly all international conventions and customary 
international law suggest that affirmative steps to redress a legacy of 
poverty on indigenous populations are a valid policy goal.  
Although the application of the first step in the three-part analysis is 
straightforward, the application of the next two steps to this fact pattern 
yield uncertain results. In Bolivia’s case, it would be difficult to 
                                                           
59 See Simon Romero, In Bolivia, Untapped Bounty Meets Nationalism, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/03/world/americas/03lithium.html?_r=1. 
60 See Bolivia Country Profile, supra note 54. 
61 See Romero, supra note 59. 
62 See Bolivia Country Profile, supra note 54. 
63 See generally Sarah Hymowitz, et al., Study Guide: The Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UNIV. 
OF MINN. HUMAN RIGHTS LIBRARY (2003), 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/edumat/studyguides/indigenous.html. 
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determine whether there exists a less discriminatory means to accomplish 
the desired policy goal which is also less harmful to private companies 
and investors. In this type of difficult situation, the ICSID tribunal should 
rely heavily on NDPs to understand the degree to which President 
Morales’s constitutional changes will foster equality in rural areas and 
whether the same level of influence could be accomplished in other 
ways. 
 
B. Civil Upheaval 
A second social issue that developing countries face is the all-too-
common problem of civil upheaval. Civil strife of any kind, including 
civil war, inflicts severe ramifications, both human and economic, on the 
future of developing nations. Additionally, even when fighting has 
ceased, a nation will likely face tremendous obstacles in its struggle to 
return to a unified country. The successful unification of a country during 
and after civil strife may only be achieved through virulent negotiation, 
with all sides making concessions. 
Furthermore, although civil strife can fundamentally change the 
political atmosphere of a nation—often completely changing the 
governmental regime—it usually does not relieve a nation of its 
international obligations, which include the nation’s BITs.  To 
understand why this is the case, consider the following hypothetical 
situation. Imagine a country in civil war where militias in the western 
part of the country have waged a multi-year campaign against the 
government primarily situated in the eastern part. Furthermore, this 
country has considerable mineral wealth concentrated in the western 
region. The militias in the west inform the government that they will not 
relinquish their arms unless they are granted greater control over the 
minerals in their part of the country. The ruling government based in the 
east has traditionally contracted with foreign corporations to exploit the 
mineral deposits in the west.  Additionally, the country’s BITs require 
the government to respect the investments of foreign corporations in 
these mineral deposits. Nevertheless, the government does not see any 
other way to end to the civil war except to accommodate the militias’ 
request for greater control over mineral rights in the western region. 
Thus, the government in the east acquiesces to the demands of the 
militia, thereby increasing the militias control over the country’s valuable 
mineral rights. 
Under the traditional test for expropriation, a tribunal might very 
well determine that an expropriation had taken place and quickly grant 
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the aggrieved parties an award for compensation from the government. 
However, under the three-factor analysis proposed above, the results may 
differ substantially. As previously mentioned, before applying the three-
factor analysis, a tribunal must first determine that an expropriation has 
taken place. In our hypothetical, whether an expropriation has taken 
place depends on the level of control taken from the foreign corporations 
and given to the militias in the west. Under the facts given, it is likely 
that the control given to the militias in the west constitute expropriation 
of mineral rights from the foreign corporations that previously held these 
rights.  
Applying the three-factor test, a tribunal must first determine 
whether the government’s act of giving the militias control over mineral 
rights held by foreign corporations was done pursuant to an 
internationally recognized policy goal. There is little doubt that ending a 
civil war and returning a country to peace is a valid policy goal. 
Sovereignty and self-determination are two of the founding principles of 
the United Nations and there can be no greater goal than a return to these 
principles from civil war. Thus, following the second and third prongs of 
the test, the tribunal should next determine whether the government 
could have stopped the civil war in a less discriminatory manner and 
whether the government could have minimized the harm caused to 
foreign corporations. These final two factors would depend on whether 
there was another way for the government to get the militias to lay down 
their arms without ceding control of the mineral rights. 
Under this fact scenario, the three-factor analysis may lead a tribunal 
to the conclusion that the ongoing civil war permitted the governments 
expropriation of mineral rights. However, such a conclusion will not 
generally be the case in all expropriations done pursuant to civil war. In 
our hypothetical above, it is clear that the mineral wealth located in the 
west region was a major reason behind the civil war. Otherwise, greater 
control of natural resources would not have sparked negotiations. Most 
civil wars are fought for multiple reasons; control of mineral wealth is 
only one of many. In a situation where control of mineral wealth is one 
of many complaints, there is considerable room for debate over whether 
peace can be achieved through expropriation of mineral rights from 
foreign investors. Thus, as demonstrated in the above hypothetical, a 
government’s responsibility for damages resulting from expropriation 
should hinge on whether its actions are reasonable and tailored narrowly 
to accomplish an internationally recognized policy goal. 
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VII.  CONCLUSION 
The various scenarios discussed above do not attempt to identify a 
bright line rule that must be followed in every situation. Instead, they are 
intended to illustrate the flexibility that developing countries require in 
international investment disputes—flexibility that is not currently present 
in international investment law. Developing countries often have to make 
difficult decisions that profoundly affect their futures. Many of these 
decisions are based on a lack of financial resources and require difficult 
decisions between competing international obligations. For instance, 
some countries like South Africa are faced with difficult decisions 
pertaining to the redress of past social injustices and the creation of a 
unified national identity. International tribunals, including ICSID 
tribunals, must allow for these unique circumstances in their proceedings 
by implementing a flexible analysis that accounts for internationally 
recognized policy goals.  One way to offer this level of flexibility is 
through the three-factor analysis proposed in this article. 
In summary,  while we may never know whether an expropriation 
did in fact take place in the Foresti case since the parties ultimately 
chose to settle outside of the tribunal,  due consideration should be given 
to the purposes behind expropriation and any alternative means that 
could have been used to accomplish the same goals. By using a less rigid 
method of analysis in expropriation cases, such as the three-factor 
analysis proposed in this article, and by relying heavily on the expertise 
of NDPs, developing countries will be better able to participate in the 
world of international investment while maintaining the flexibility that 
their individual circumstances require. 
